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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 18-3794 
______________ 
 
MODUPE WILLIAMS, 
                                                                                  Appellant 
 
      v. 
 
PENNRIDGE SCHOOL DISTRICT; TOM CREEDEN; 
NICHOLAS SCHOONOVER 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-15-cv-04163) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 28, 2019 
 
BEFORE:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 30, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
____________________ 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes on before this Court on the appeal of plaintiff-appellant, 
Modupe Williams, challenging an order  of the District Court of August 7, 2017, under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissing retaliation claims she asserted against defendants, 
Pennridge School District, Tom Creeden, and Nicholas Schoonover, and an order of the 
Court of December 6, 2018, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 granting summary judgment against 
racial and gender discrimination claims that she asserted on the same three defendants.  
See Williams v. Pennridge Sch. Dist., No. 15-4163, 2018 WL 6413314 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 
2018).  Creeden and Schoonover are principals of Pennridge High School at which 
Modupe was a student.  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1332 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  For the reasons stated below, we 
will affirm the District Court’s appealed orders. 
 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
We recite the relevant facts from the record viewing them in the light most 
favorable to Modupe.1  Modupe, a female African-American, was a student at Pennridge 
High School during the times germane to this opinion.  Between 2010 and 2012, while 
she was a student at Pennridge, there were seven incidents which she alleged constituted 
discrimination against her by defendants as well as discrimination and harassment against 
her by fellow students who are not defendants in this case.  The first incident was in the 
                                              
1 Our use of Modupe Williams’s first name in this opinion is not because of a lack of 
respect for her.  Rather we do so because we refer to her mother, Deborah Williams, in 
this opinion and use their first names to avoid confusion. 
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2010-2011 school year, when she received a Presidential Award for academic merit and 
was the only African-American student at Pennridge that year to receive the award.  At 
the award ceremony, her name was not announced and she was the only student to 
receive the award whose name was not mentioned.  After the ceremony, she confronted 
the guidance counselor, Gina Dubona, and expressed her upset at not having been 
publicly recognized at the ceremony.  Dubona told her a mistake had been made and 
apologized.  Nevertheless, Modupe alleged in her complaint that the omission was 
discriminatory because she was the only student to receive the Presidential Award whose 
name was not called and because the guidance counselor was dismissive when Modupe 
complained of the omission. 
The second incident was in the following school year, while Modupe was enrolled 
in a 19th Century American Culture class that Cara Lyn Gurysh taught.  On January 6, 
2012, she was working on a group project in the computer lab.  At some point, with 
permission, she went to the bathroom, leaving her belongings at her computer when she 
did so.  When she returned, her backpack had been moved and a Caucasian boy named 
Sammy had taken the seat that had been hers.  She protested to Sammy stating “excuse 
me, I was sitting there”, to which he replied, “well, not anymore.”  Williams, 2018 WL 
6413314, at *1.  She informed Gurysh of what had happened to which Gurysh responded, 
“oh, well, you can go to the library where there[ are] computers there and you work by 
yourself over there.”  Id.  Modupe believes that there was a racial motivation underlying 
the incident because “there was no reason that [Gurysh] should have given Sammy the 
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seat, the white boy, . . . instead of having him go down to the library, being that [she] was 
using the computer first.”  Id. (first and last alteration in original). 
Modupe and her mother, Deborah Williams, complained about the incident to 
Gurysh.  Deborah testified at her deposition that her multiple attempts to contact Gurysh 
about the matter had not been successful until she saw Gurysh in a school hallway.  
When Deborah asked Gurysh why she never followed up on the computer matter, 
Deborah testified Gurysh stated that “she felt it wasn’t important.”  Id. at *2.  When 
deposed, Gurysh stated that she routinely sent students to the library when all of the 
computers in the lab were in use, and that she sent students she knew would continue to 
work and kept students with behavioral problems closer to her.  She said she trusted 
Modupe to work diligently and indicated that Modupe was the only student sent to the 
library on that day.  Gurysh also stated that she apologized to Modupe for the incident. 
The third incident started in early 2012, prior to the school’s spring break.  At that 
time Modupe began receiving phone calls on her cell phone from a private number that 
she did not answer.  On April 4, 2012, the first day of spring break, she was at her 
grandmother’s home when someone called her cell phone from a private number.  
Beginning with this call and continuing to April 6, 2012, she answered approximately 19 
phone calls in which the callers described her as “b**ch” and made sexually vulgar 
statements along the lines of “you know us n**gers like to f**k in the ass.”  Id.  The 
words “b**ch” and “n**ger” were used in multiple phone calls.  Id.  In one call, the 
caller asked, “how f***ing drunk were your parents when they named you Modupe?”  Id.  
Many times, Modupe simply hung up on the calls. 
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On Easter Sunday, Modupe told her mother, Deborah Williams, about the phone 
calls.  Deborah then began to answer these calls pretending to be Modupe.  The callers 
were young males who made explicit, racist, and sexual comments to Deborah similar to 
those that had been made to Modupe.  During one of these calls, the caller revealed 
himself as Tom K. or Tom Kantner.  That same night, Deborah called the police about 
the matter.  According to the police, Modupe indicated that the calls came as a surprise, 
that she had not received similar calls in the past, and that she had not experienced 
harassment at school prior to the calls.  The police obtained phone records that identified 
the callers as Frankie Buccafuri, Tom Kantner, and Henry Savage.  
On April 10, 2012, Modupe reported having received the phone calls to the 
Pennridge assistant principal, defendant Nicholas Schoonover.  Schoonover listened to 
the recordings of some of the phone calls and was informed that the police were involved.  
Schoonover told Modupe that because none of the calls were made at the school, it was 
not a school issue.  Nevertheless, that same day, Schoonover met with Buccafuri, 
Kantner, and Savage individually, but each denied involvement.  Schoonover also 
contacted the police about the calls but they told him that “this was a community issue” 
and “was not related to in school.”  Id. at *3.  Moreover, they advised him not to have 
any involvement in the matter.  Id.  However, at Deborah’s request, Schoonover met with 
Buccafuri, Kantner, and Savage a second time about the calls. 
Eventually, the juvenile authorities initiated proceedings against Buccafuri, 
Kantner, and Savage, which led to their being placed on probation.  Aspects of their 
probation required that they write a letter of apology to Modupe and perform community 
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service.  Modupe was satisfied with this disposition, and there were no reports of any 
additional phone calls or harassment by the boys, nor any indication that she had any 
contact with them after the incidents we have described. 
Following the phone calls, there were three more incidents involving other 
students that Modupe considered harassing.  First, she testified that she heard, through the 
mother of a friend, that during the week immediately following spring break, another girl 
said that Buccafuri was telling other students in gym class about making the harassing 
phone calls.  Second, when Modupe confronted another student about cheating off of her 
work in class, he responded, “are you going to call the cops on me too?”  Id. at *11.  She 
believed that the reference to the police related to the phone calls incidents.  Lastly, she 
overheard an unidentified boy in a school hallway commenting to his friends “something 
along the lines of how drunk were you when they named you Modupe,” an apparent 
reference to one of the phone calls.  Id.  At her deposition Modupe conceded that none of 
these boys was speaking to her directly, nor was there any evidence that they intended her 
to hear the comment.  
The last incident was on May 25, 2012.  Schoonover met with Modupe, Deborah, 
and guidance counselor Lori D’Angelo to discuss Modupe’s completion of the school 
year and her plans for the next school year and beyond.  Deborah confided that Modupe 
had been seeing a therapist and had been taking medication.  The participants at the 
meeting discussed the possibility of Modupe’s finishing the year with homebound 
instruction.  Schoonover suggested that Modupe should be hospitalized over the summer, 
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attend an alternative school in the fall, and, when she was ready to cope, return to 
Pennridge. 
On May 31, 2012, a few days before the end of the school year, Deborah met with 
Schoonover and defendant principal Tom Creeden, and presented them with a written 
complaint, alleging that Modupe had been the subject of discrimination on the basis of 
her race and gender during the incidents we describe above.  However, Deborah did not 
leave a copy of the complaint with defendants and they did not investigate the matters.  
Modupe and Deborah did not reach out to the school again, and before the start of the 
next school year, they relocated out of the school district so Modupe no longer was a 
Pennridge student.  
On July 29, 2015, Modupe filed this suit against the school district, Creeden, and 
Schoonover.  In her second amended complaint, she pleaded claims for: (1) race 
discrimination by the school district in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; (2) gender discrimination by the school district in violation of 
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); (3) race and 
gender discrimination by all defendants in violation of the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 953; (4) violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution by all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) 
retaliation under Title VI  by the school district; (6) retaliation under Title IX by the 
school district; and (7) retaliation under the PHRA by all defendants.  On defendants’ 
motion, the District Court dismissed the retaliation claims on August 7, 2017.  At the 
close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims 
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which was granted on December 6, 2018.  See Williams, 2018 WL 6413314.  Modupe 
appeals from both dispositions. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion to Dismiss 
We first will address the District Court’s dismissal of Modupe’s retaliation claims.  
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted.  Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 353 (3d Cir. 
2018).  In determining whether a plaintiff states a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “we accept 
all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff.  However, we disregard threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
legal conclusions, and conclusory statements.”  City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource 
Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 878-79 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.”  Zuber v. Boscov’s, 871 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). 
In order to establish a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that she (1) engaged 
in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) suffered an adverse action at the hands of a 
public official, and (3) her constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or 
motivating factor in the adverse action.  Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 
2016).  Adverse action, in this context, must be “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary 
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firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights.”  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 
(3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (alteration in original). 
Because motivation is almost never subject to proof by direct evidence, 
[Plaintiff] must rely on circumstantial evidence to prove a retaliatory 
motive.  [She] can satisfy [her] burden with evidence of either (1) an 
unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and 
the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with 
timing that suggests a causal link. 
 
Watson, 834 F.3d at 422.  We apply the same standard for a retaliation claim whether 
raised under Title VI, Title IX, or the PHRA.  See Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 
913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997); Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2003). 
  Modupe argues that defendants retaliated against her for making her formal May 
31, 2012 complaint to which we have referred as well as her numerous informal verbal 
complaints by (1) allowing other students to harass her at school, (2) making the 
“hospitalization” comment, (3) “de facto” removing her from the school district, and (4) 
delaying release of her transcript to her new school.2  The District Court found that none 
of these actions qualified as an “adverse action” under the retaliation standard.  We agree.  
To begin, none of the defendants actually harassed Modupe.  Instead, her harassment 
theory posited that defendants retaliated against her by allowing her fellow students to 
harass her without taking corrective action.  But with the exception of the phone calls, the 
harassing incidents of which she complains were isolated from each other, and 
defendants took action to address the harassing phone calls.  In fact, much of what 
                                              
2 We assume, for the purposes of this opinion, that Modupe engaged in constitutionally 
protected conduct. 
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Modupe considers harassment was not harassment at all—she simply overheard or later 
learned of unflattering comments by other students about her that were not made to her 
directly.   
In any event, we are unsure what corrective action defendants could have taken 
beyond what they did.  Moreover, Modupe does not explain why retaliation was the 
motivating factor in defendants’ alleged failure to act, given that the harassment began 
before she made her complaints and not because of the complaints.3  
 The rest of the alleged retaliatory actions were simply offshoots of her harassment 
claim.  Defendants did not take any affirmative actions against Modupe.  The suggestion 
for hospitalization came after defendants learned of her difficulty in dealing with the 
harassment by fellow students.  But defendants did not inform or advise her that she 
should not attend Pennridge any longer—she decided to leave voluntarily.  They also did 
not withhold her transcript to her new school—there was simply a delay in sending it.4  
                                              
3 Indeed, Modupe’s allegations, taken as a whole, appear to argue that defendants 
retaliated by not taking action on her complaints.  We fail to see how the lack of response 
to a complaint sufficiently would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising her 
rights. 
 
4 Modupe seems to regard the failure to provide the transcript to her new school more 
promptly as a significant event, arguing that it would deter a reasonable person from 
filing complaints.  However, when she wanted the transcripts sent she was no longer a 
student at Pennridge.  We fail to see why the delay would deter her from exercising her 
rights at the new school or continuing her complaints against defendants.  We also do not 
understand her reliance on our decision in EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746 (3d 
Cir. 1997), to support this assertion—that case was an attorney’s fees dispute, and the 
underlying retaliation claim was decided against the plaintiff, which on appeal we did not 
overturn. 
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These allegations do not facially state a claim of retaliation.  In sum, we will affirm the 
Court’s dismissal of Modupe’s retaliation claims. 
B. Summary Judgment 
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Bradley v. W. 
Chester Univ. of Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 880 F.3d 643, 650 (3d Cir. 2018).  “Our 
review of the District Court’s [summary judgment] decision is plenary, and we apply the 
same standard as the District Court to determine whether summary judgment was 
appropriate.”  State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  “Thus, summary judgment is properly granted ‘if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.’”  Sconiers v. United States, 896 F.3d 595, 597 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 
Modupe asserted that defendants discriminated against her because of her race and 
gender.  She raised claims under Title VI for racial discrimination, Title IX for gender 
discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause, and the PHRA.  The hallmark of all of these 
claims is intentional discrimination.  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 283, 121 S.Ct. 
1511, 1518 (2001) (Title VI); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173, 
125 S.Ct. 1497, 1504 (2005) (Title IX); Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. Of 
Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 196 (3d Cir. 2009) (Equal Protection Clause); Fasold 
v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 184 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) (PHRA). 
Intentional discrimination may be proven by either (1) direct evidence of willful 
discrimination, Fasold, 409 F.3d at 184, or (2) a showing of deliberate indifference by 
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defendants to events adverse to the plaintiff, see Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 
F.3d 247, 273 (3d Cir. 2014).  To establish intentional discrimination by deliberate 
indifference in a school harassment context, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant 
had substantial control over the harassers, (2) she suffered severe and discriminatory 
harassment, (3) the defendant had actual knowledge of the harassment, and (4) the 
defendant  failed to correct the harassment.  Id.  “[I]n order to establish deliberate 
indifference, a plaintiff must show that the [defendant] had knowledge of the alleged 
misconduct and the power to correct it but nonetheless failed to do so.”  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
Modupe relied on evidence of the aforementioned seven incidents as support for 
her discrimination claims: (1) the omission of her identification at the award ceremony; 
(2) the computer lab incident; (3) the “hospitalization” comment; (4) the harassing phone 
calls; (5) the student talking about his phone calls; (6) the “cops” comment; and (7) the 
hallway comment.  The first three appear to be attempts to allege willful discrimination, 
while the latter four appear to be attempts to allege deliberate indifference to adverse 
action against her.  We are satisfied that all seven incidents, taken separately or as a 
whole, fail to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. 
With regard to willful discrimination, the only evidence of intent Modupe 
proffered to support her claim was to draw an inference that defendants acted against her 
because she was an African-American female.  But as we have repeatedly held, evidence 
of disparate treatment, alone, is insufficient to establish discriminatory intent.  PG Publ’g 
Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 116 (3d Cir. 2013); Cmty. Servs. Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. 
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Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 182 (3d Cir. 2005); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Flaherty, 983 F.2d 
1267, 1273 (3d Cir. 1993); Kromnick v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 739 F.2d 894, 911 (3d Cir. 
1984).  Indeed, even if we ignore defendants’ stated non-discriminatory reasons to justify 
their conduct, there was still no evidence that they had an intent to discriminate.  On a 
summary judgment motion made against a plaintiff’s claims the plaintiff has the burden 
to make a prima facie showing of her claims.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
331, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2557 (1986) (“If the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient 
evidence to make out its claim, a trial would be useless and the moving party is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law.” (citation omitted)).  Modupe’s case does not 
overcome the prima facie case hurdle. 
Examined under the deliberate indifference standard, Modupe’s claim fails for two 
reasons.  First, with the exception of the phone calls to which defendants cannot be said 
to have been deliberately indifferent, none of the incidents amounted to severe and 
discriminatory harassment.  Indeed, in two of the three incidents on which she relies as 
evidence of harassment, the comments made about her by fellow students were not even 
directed at her—she either overheard, or later found out from a third party about, those 
comments.  It cannot be said that she was “harassed” by fellow students when they had 
not intended for her to hear those comments.  These incidents may be strong evidence 
that her fellow students disliked her, but they are not evidence of harassment. 
Second, Williams did not show that defendants had the power to stop the 
misconduct but failed to do so.  Again, with the exception of the phone calls to which 
defendants took action, the other incidents were isolated, were not committed by the 
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same students, did not show a pattern capable of repetition, and were not related or linked 
in any way.  Moreover, as we stated above, we are unsure what corrective action 
defendants could have taken.  To the extent she feared other students may continue to 
make disparaging remarks about her to each other, defendants obviously lacked the 
power to prevent them from making derogatory comments—while schools may exert 
substantial control over their students, they do not have the power to command the entire 
student body to change its opinion of any single student. 
As for the phone calls, evidence in the record did not establish a prima facie case 
of deliberate indifference.  Despite the fact that the phone calls were made outside of the 
school, and that the police informed defendants not to be involved, defendants 
nevertheless spoke to the offending students on two separate occasions.  Moreover, after 
juvenile charges were filed against the offenders and they were required to apologize 
formally to Modupe and perform community service, she did not complain that the 
disposition of the cases was insufficient nor demand further action.  And most 
importantly, she did not receive any more harassing phone call after defendants became 
involved in the matter.  In the circumstances, it is clear that defendants’ reaction to the 
phone calls demonstrated that they were not deliberately indifferent to them.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
defendants. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
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For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s August 7, 2017 
order dismissing Modupe’s retaliations claims and its December 6, 2018 order granting 
summary judgment in favor of defendants on the balance of her case. 
 
